Voices from Stillman's Run:

Governor John Reynolds Remembers the Battle

 

On the day before we commenced the march up Rock River, I engaged two trusty and worthy spies, Colonel John Ewing and Major John A. Wakefield, to discover the location of the enemy if possible, and report to me on our progress up the river. I employed also a guide, Mr. Kinney, who could understand imperfectly the Sac language, to accompany them.

On the 10th of May, the spies met the army near the Prophet's town, on Rock River, and had captured an Indian. He informed us, truly, that Black Hawk and his band were on Rock River, above Dixon. About twelve miles above the Prophet's town we encamped, and decided to leave the onerous and cumbersome baggage and make a forced march to overtake the hostile Indians. I wrote a letter to General Atkinson of the facts, and we marched off early in the morning hoping to overtake Black Hawk in a short time.

We reached Dixon on the morning of the 12th, and there received information from Colonels Stephenson, Strode, and others, that scouts had been out for fifty miles up the river, and around; that the hostile Indians had dispersed to collect food, and that they were nowhere near in a body. This information, coming from Mr. Dixon and other respectable sources, gained credence, and we gave up the pursuit of the enemy until General Atkinson arrived with the boats and provisions. We had with us only provisions enough for a day or two and that was nearly exhausted. This information was distressing and painful to the army, but we believed the report and acted on it accordingly.

Judging from this information I believe Black Hawk was about to reside on the lands of the Pottawatomies, and to prevent it I addressed a "talk" to the chiefs of that nation at the Pawpaw Grove. I selected five young and energetic men from the army…to bear the dispatch to the Indians. The Pawpaw Grove was about fifty miles from Dixon. These messengers in the cloudy weather got bewildered and fell in on a party of hostile Indians belonging to Black-Hawk's band. The Indians tried in a very adroit manner to decoy the whites to the large band of warriors, but the Americans eluded the attempt. After much diplomacy, on horseback the whites escaped to the main army, and the Indians to their grand army, both to obtain recruits. These young men were exhausted, as well as their horses, when they reached the army at Dixon. They had been on horseback almost forty-eight hours, without rest, food, or sleep, and were in danger of being killed.

When the army arrived at Dixon and gave up the pursuit of the enemy for the present, we found the two battalions of Major Stillman and Bailey, whom I had ordered to protect the frontiers at Dixon, with plenty of provisions, and had performed little or no service since they were organized.

The officers and privates of these battalions solicited me warmly to permit them to reconnoitre the frontiers, and report where the enemy were lodged, if they could discover it.

It was rumored that a small band of the Black-Hawk party were camped at the head of "Old-Man's Creek," about twelve miles above Dixon. I considered that these troops would be better moving about than camped, and that it was my duty to place them on the frontier. They might discover the enemy. I signed the following order to Major Stillman:

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DIXON'S FERRY, May 12th, 1832. TO MAJOR STILLMAN:

You will cause the troops under your immediate command and the battalion under Major Bailey, to proceed without delay, with four days' provisions, to the head of "Old-Man's Creek,'" where it is supposed there are some hostile Indians, and coerce them into submission.

JOHN REYNOLDS,

Com. in Chief of the Illinois Militia

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Major Stillman was, at the time he commanded the battalion, a general of the militia north of the Illinois River, and was a military man in good standing. I knew many prominent men in this corps—Colonels Stephenson and Strode, and many other distinguished characters. One misfortune was, the officers, Stillman and Bailey, had some misunderstanding as to the command of the battalion.

On the 13th of May, in the morning, Major Stillman marched out from Dixon with military display. He had with him about two hundred and seventy-five men, with the necessary equipments.

While the Brigade of General Whiteside was waiting for General Atkinson and the provisions, so as to march against the enemy, about one o'clock of the night of the 15th of May, the stragglers and soldiers of Major Stillman, who had escaped from the battle, reached my tent at Dixon, and narrated such horrid and tragical stories of the disaster with the Indians, that it was truly alarming and shocking. The soldiers, after the retreat, arrived at Dixon in utter confusion, without the least order or discipline, and each one told his story according to his own terrified imagination. According as the tales of woe and horror were told, they impressed the army at Dixon with the confused idea of much bloodshed and carnage. Those narrating the disaster generally believed and stated they were about all that had escaped. Often while one was telling of the destruction of his comrade, the person himself would appear and contradict the story of his death. Such confusive and contradictory statements were at first told, that no one knew what to believe. I recollect that my first impression was that most of the battalion were destroyed, but the stragglers kept coming in until we saw that the affair was not so bad as we had expected it to be at first.

In the morning, the troops who were in the battle were paraded, and it appeared that fifty-two were absent, and we presumed that number had been killed. This figure got into the papers from the morning's report, and circulated throughout the United States.

Major Stillman had marched his battalion twenty-five miles up Rock River, in a wrong direction from my order, and was about sunset the second day, (the 14th of May, 1832,) preparing to canp within a few miles of the main lodgement of Black Hawk and a portion of his band. During the preparations to camp the troops were in much confusion and disorder. The Major had omitted to have either spies or sentinels out at this important crisis. In this confused state of the troops, some unsaddling their horses, others making fires, some fixing tent poles, and all in a state of easy carelessness and security, three Indians, unarmed, with a white flag, made their appearance near the encampment. These Indians gave themselves up, and were taken into custody, as hostages, by order of the officers. Not many, or perhaps any of the Americans understood the Indian language sufficiently to hold a conversation with them, but it would seem, the circumstances of the case were sufficiently expressive to make all understand the motive of the prisoners. Soon after the three unarmed Indians were taken into custody, six armed Indians appeared on horseback on a hill three-fourths of a mile from the encampment. Without any orders, a few soldiers and some officers commenced an irregular chase of the Indians, on horseback, and pursued them for four or five miles. During this race in the prairie, a great portion of the troops mounted their horses and joined, without orders, in the disorderly chase of the Indians. The whites became engaged is the pursuit, and having the best horses, overtook two Indians and killed them. Major Hackleton, of Fulton County, was dismounted, and had a personal combat with an Indian also dismounted. By assistance from the whites, the Major killed his tawny antagonist. In this irregular running conflict three Indians were killed, without any loss of the whites.

During this skirmish, which extended over four or five miles of the smooth prairie, between the encampment and the mouth of Sycamore Creek, the volunteers at the camp knowing blood was shed, attempted to kill the three unarmed Indians, who had been taken into custody as hostages; under the protection of a white flag. One Indian was killed, but in the dark and confusion the other two escaped unhurt.

At the time Stillman's volunteers had this running skirmish in the prairie, Black Hawk had many of his friends of the Pottawatomie nation feasting with him on dog meat. He had a lodgment established on Rock River at the mouth of Sycamore Creek, at which place he was entertaining his friends at the time.

The retreating Indians had almost reached the camp of Black Hawk; where he was feasting, and the whites at their heels, hooping, yelling, and shouting, after the manner of a disorderly battle with the Indians. This uproar alarmed Black Hawk and the Indians at the feast, and they, in a hasty, tumultuous manner, mounted their horses, snatched up their arms, and rushed out in all the fury of a mad lioness in defence of their women and children.

Black Hawk took a prudent and wise stand, concealed behind some woods, (then nearly dark,) so that the straggling and unmanageable forces of Major Stillman approached near him.

It was a crisis with the Indians—they fought in defence of all held the most sacred on earth, and they performed their operations under the eye of an experienced warrior, Black Hawk himself.

This aged warrior and his band (all he could muster at the moment) marched out from his concealment, and fell in with fury and havoc on the disorderly troops of Stillman, who were

scattered for miles over the prairie. Black Hawk turned the tide of war, and chased the whites with great fury.

The camp of Black Hawk was five or six miles from the encampment of Major Stillman, and the Indians forced the whites back to the white camp with great speed, and killed in the chase one white man

By the time the volunteers reached Stillman's camp it was dark and the troops at the camp, hearing the yelling, terrible sounds of the horses' feet, and shooting, supposed all the warriors of the whole Black Hawk band were on them like an avalanche. This produced a general panic and indifference of exertions of the officers and the volunteers, although placed in battle array at the camp, fled with their comrades whom Black Hawk was chasing.

A small muddy creek flowed near the camp of Stillman, and crossing of it was difficult for both whites and Indians. Horses mired in it, and some white men were killed in it. This creek has been baptised with the name of Stillman's Run, which it retains to this day. After the troops crossed the creek, the officers made an effort to rally them, but to no purpose. A general and furious retreat was commenced, each one seeking own safety according to his own discretion. It was in this fused and precipitated flight, where most of the volunteers, were killed, closed their eyes, forever. One case in particular among many others, excited much sympathy and deep feeling: Captain Adams was found dead with two Indians, also dead, near him. This bloody personal combat was off from the general route, a short distance up the creek. The evidence was seen the next day by many, of the most shocking fight between three men, and all three lay dead within a few feet of each other. No one remained alive to tell the story of the battle. They fought with every class of weapon in their possession, and the guns shivered, and the mortal wounds inflicted, proved that all used in this deadly conflict. The earth was soft in the spring, and the evidence next day remained on it of the utmost exertions of human power in this battle, where two contended against one. The wounds were deep and numerous on the three dead bodies, made by rifle balls, spears., tomahawks, and butcher knives. The Indians did not scalp Captain Adams, giving him the honor of a great brave.

The Indians chased the whites twelve or fifteen miles, and the horses of the volunteers being the fleetest, saved the corps.

It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of Indians under Black Hawk that were engaged in the battle. Black Hawk in his book says he had only forty in all, and judging from all I can discover in the premises, I believe the number of warriors were between fifty and sixty-some of the volunteers engaged in the scene supposed them to be several hundred, and some presumed them to be all of Black Hawk's warriors, which would swell them up to four or five hundred.

It was true, as it was reported to me by confidential scouts, that the warriors at the time were not in a body, but were scattered in search of roots to eat, and that only a few were together in a band. It is an incontestable fact, that Black Hawk had made no arrangements for the battle, or otherwise he would not have been found at his ease-feasting his friends among his women and children-and it is astonishing that he did make such an effort on the spur of the occasion as he did. He had, I presume, the permission of the Pottawatomies, on whose land he was, to establish a village there, as the squaws had commenced to sow their seeds and to plant their grain for a crop, on Rock River, at the mouth of Sycamore Creek.

Black Hawk says in his book, which I believe to be true, that he tried at Stillman's Run to call back his warriors, as he supposed the whites were making a sham retreat on purpose to draw him into an ambuscade of the whole army, under General Whiteside. He says he had not the least idea that the whites were retreating in good earnest, but he could not draw off his young warriors. Their courage gave him great pleasure, as he stated.

Major Hackleton and some others on foot escaped, and reached the army at Dixon in safety. It was ascertained the next day after the battle, that only eleven white men were killed, instead of the number first reported to have been slain, which greatly quieted the public mind. About eight Indians were killed in all.

The cause of this disaster was the want of discipline, subordination, and the proper previous arrangements of the officers. The material of this corps was as good and efficient as ever appeared "in the deadly breach;" but they were citizens uninformed in the science and art of war. If those volunteers, officers, and privates, had been trained to war, and commanded by an Anthony Wayne or an Andrew Jackson, they would have been able to whip, in a pitched battle, Black Hawk and his whole band. This battle and hasty retreat was much condemned by the army and the public generally.

The Indians destroyed all the wagons and property, which the volunteers abandoned in their camps. I saw, the next day after the battle, the fragments of cut and burned wagons, and other articles, that showed the evidence of savage warfare. Empty kegs were also left, that had contained as the Indians call it, "fire-water." This was a partial cause of the disasters, it was supposed at the time.


 

Source: Reynolds, John. My Own Times. (1879; rpt. 1968) 229-235.

 


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